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DEFENSE.-[Vermont] One Shufelt, give effect to considerations of moda resident of Vermont, went to Ne- ern public policy. Some are quite
vada and obtained a divorce. De- old, such as the bigamy statute
fendant, also a resident of Vermont, which dates back to 1 Jac. I, c. 11,
This exercise of police
accompanied him and they were (1604).
married in Nevada. Shortly after- power is well recognized and is
rarely, if ever, questioned, the courts
wards they returned to Vermont
where they cohabitated as man and tending to construe these statutes
wife. Defendant was prosecuted strictly in the modern cases. In the
and convicted of adultery, the court face of the inevitable injustices done,
holding that the Nevada divorce was however, where intent is not coninvalid in Vermont. On appeal, sidered, it may be time to reconsider
the bases for the existence of these
affirmed. Held: An honest belief
in the validity of a void divorce is statutes. Perhaps we have gone
no defense to a charge of adultery. further than is necessary for the
State v. Woods, 179 Atl. 1 (Vt. protection of the public. See Com1935).
ment 94 Cent. L. J. 13 (1922).
The public policy upon which any
As a general principle of criminal
law, an act, in order to be a crime, particular statute is based may demust be done with a criminal in- pend on one or more considerations.
tent. But legislatures have passed Thus, society jealously protects the
some statutes so framed and con- marriage status by prohibiting adulstrued that "the intention with tery and bigamy. Again, parental
which the act is done or the lack of and guardian interests in minors
any criminal intent in the premises finds protection by statutes against
will be immaterial." 1 Wharton, abduction. Then, the nature of some
offenses is such that it is difficult
(12th ed. 1932)
CRIrmINAL LAW
§143. See also Bishop, "Statutory to prove that a criminal mind exists
Crimes" (3rd ed. 1901) §596b. In when the unlawful act occurs. Unthis category of statutory offenses lawful sales and bigamy prosecuare (1) police regulations such as tion, among others, are subject
In Reg. v.
unlawful sales of liquor, drugs, and to this obstacle.
adulterated foods, election laws, Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889),
building ordinances, etc., (2) abduc- some judges feared that prolific
tion, seduction, and statutory rape, use of excuses would make it
(3) bigamy and adultery. These almost impossible to prove a crimi[930]
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nal mind. By dispensing with the
need for such proof, prosecution is
made simpler and conviction mire
certain. Lastly, minor police ca-es
are more quickly and inexpensively
disposed of when proof of criminal
intent is not necessary.
But the results obtained from
these statutes are sometimes very
harsh. Witness the bigamous guilt
of a woman who married a second
time while reasonably believing that
her first husband was dead, when he
had not been gone for the statutory
seven. years. Comm. v. Nash, 48
Mass. 472 (1844). Again, a second
marriage effected upon faith in a
clerk's certificate of divorce was
held to be bigamous, Russell v.
State, 66 Ark. 185, 49 S. W. 821
(1899), as was also a marriage entered into upon advice of a lawyer,
State v. Armington, 25 Minn. 29
(1878), and upon advice of a Justice
of the Peace, State v. Goodenow, 65
Me. 30 (1876). Similar results have
obtained where divorces were procured but not recognized as valid.
The People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78
(1879) Hood v. State, 56 Ind. 263
(1877); State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15 245 Pac. 375 (1926); The
People v. Spoor, 235 Ili. 230, 85 N.
E. 207 (1908) ; Earl Russell's Case,
[1901] A. C. 446.
The imposition of unnecessary
hardship and inconvenience has
sometimes been prevented by statutory construction. Rex v. Banks,
1 Esp. 144 (1794) (unlawful possession of navy stores) ; Bernard v.
Vaughan, 8 T. R. 149 (1799)
(bankruptcy). Lord Kenyon, in
Fowler v. Padget, 7 T. R. 509
(1798) (bankruptcy) said, "I would
adopt any construction of the
statute that the words will bear to
avoid such monstrous consequences."
And even where ordinary construction of bigamy statutes impels a
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strict interpretation, a minority of
courts have permitted the defense
of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. Baker v. State. 86
Neb. 775, 126 N. W. 300 (1910)
(bigamy); State v. Cain, 106 La.
708, 31 S. 300 (1902); Squires v.
State, 46 Ind. 459 (1874) ; Chapman
v. State, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 591, 179
S. W. 570 (1915); Regina v. Tolson, supra; State v. Audette, 81 Vt.
400, 70 Atl. 833 (1908) (adultery).
But, as in the instant case, none permit the defense of mistake of law.
Even in England, where the rule
in Reg. v. Tolson, supra, in bigamy
cases, permits a defense of mistake
of fact as to the death of a spouse
within the seven year period of absence, the courts refuse to permit
a similar defense where one marries
a second time upon the mistaken belief in the finality of attempted divorce proceedings, Rex v. Wheat
[1921] 2 K. B. 119, or in the validity of a divorce. Earl Russell's Case
[1901] A. C., 446.
Courts have uniformly refused to
recognize any distinctioni between
ignorance of law and a mistake of
law. But such a distinction might
well be made. Surely there is a
difference between the state of
mind of one who acts in utter indifference to the fact that a law
may exist and one, who while knowing of the existence of a law, acts
upon his reasonable though mistaken
understanding of it. To maintain
that the lav is certain and therefore ignorance (including mistake)
is no excuse, especially in the field
of divorce, is to disregard self-evident conflicts. Thus,' a mistaken
application of law to facts seems
very much comparable to a mistake
of fact, both negativing the existence of a criminal mind, and where
the courts permit the latter as a
defense, they might, with as much
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reason, also permit the former. See
Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in
the Criminal Law (1908) 22 Harv.
L. Rev. 75.
Must individuals inevitably suffer
injustices in order that public policy
may be adequately enforced? Perhaps some such solution as this
might be resorted to: In the administration of minor police regulations,
often punishable merely by fines,
or where the act is in itself immoral,
such as taking away a girl from the
care of her father, Reg. v. Prince,
L. R. 2 C. C. 154 (1875) (abduction)
or having sexual intercourse where
the girl is below a statutory age,
Comm. v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66,
42 N. E. 504 (1896) (statutory
rape), there is more justification for
strict statutory construction, with
no need for proof of intent. But
there is nothing so inherently immoral about marriage tor warrant
similar treatment in bigamy cases.
Nor does there seem to be anything
immoral about the fact that a woman
is found in bed with a man after the
two have made all possible efforts to
legally become husband and wife.
Surely here is no attempt to transgress the law, but rather to conform to it. Such unintentional
breaches of statutory regulations or
prohibitions should not carry with
it the disgrace of conviction and
a prison sentence as punishment.
Conceding that the majority of
bigamy and adultery statutes in the
United States are so framed that
anything but strict construction
would be contra to usual statutory
interpretation, it may be appropriate
to suggest that provisos be added to
these statutes permitting a defendant to present a defense of good
faith, on a showing of a mistake of
law or fact, which would go
towards rebutting the presumption
that criminal intent is inherent in

the act. The effect of this would
be to permit a jury to make a full
determination of guilt or innocence,
taking all the facts into consideration. The defendant, facing a serious and severe punishment, would
have a chance to defend himself
where he has been an innocent victim of circumstances, deluded as to
the actual facts or the law applicable thereto. The presumption of
intent would remain so strong
against the, defendant that there
would be little or no loss of effectiveness in enforcement, while de,serving defendants in hard cases
would not suffer the indignities and
disgrace of conviction, as in the
instant case, with little or no compensating public gain.
MARVIN FINDER.

ELEcTIONS -

ADDING

IMPROPER

VOTES AT GENERAL ELECrION
FEDERAL OFFENSF-

AS

[Federal] .- Ap-

pellants, at the general election of
November 8, 1932, where both federal and state officers were to be
elected, interfered with voters at
the voting machines, rang up votes
on the machines, forged signatures
of voters, and turned the voting
machines in improper positions in
the polling places. They were convicted below under a federal statute
making it a crime for two or more
persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right secured to him
by the Constitution or laws of the
United States.

16 STAT. 140 (1870)

18 U. S. C. A. § 51 (1927). On appeal, reversed. Held: the government must prove
every fact
necessary to constitute the offense,
and there was here no evidence
that any qualified voter who was
interfered with intended to vote
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for a candidate for federal office.
The trial court's charge to the jury
that ". . . if some one improperly
rang up votes, that may be considered an injury to persons who
had . . . legally . . . cast their
votes . . . because they were not
getting the full value of their
votes" fwas error. United States
v. Kantor, 78 F. (2d) 710 (C. C.
A. 2d,. 1935).
That the federal government has
power to regulate the election of
federal officers is well established.
U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, Section 4;
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651
(1884) (beating a negro to prevent
his voting); Ex Parte Siebold, 100
U. S. 399 (1879) (stuffing ballot
box); Ex Parte Clark, 100 U. S.

399. (1879)

(election officer per-

mitted breaking ballot box). See
generally, 18 U. S. C. A. §51, p.
70. In 1870 a comprehensive law
specifically designed to protect and
regulate
federal
elections was
passed. Act of May 31, 1870,

16

STAT.

140; Rav.

STAT.

§§5506,

5511 to 5515 inclusive, 5520 to 5523
inclusive. At that time this section
prohibiting a conspiracy to deprive
a citizen of rights secured to him
under the laws of the United States
was also passed. By Act of Febru-

ary 8, 1894 (28

STAT.

36), most of

the above sections relating to offenses against the elective franchise
were repealed; however, this conspiracy section (§51) was retained,
as were several other sections dealing specifically with elections: 18

U- S..C. A. §§52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59.
Section 51 has long been held to afford protection against a conspiracy
to deprive a citizen of the right to
vote. United States v. Stone, 188
Fed. 836 (D. Md., 1911) (held an
"injury" under §51 to so complicate
the ballots as to make it difficult
for illiterate negro voters to vote).
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However, these statutes have generally been strictly construed. Even
under a section of the Act of 1870
specifically dealing with election of-

fenses (Rrv.

STAT.

§5511, now re-

pealed),
the indictment, which
stated a fradulant attempt to vote
at an election where both federal
and state officers were to be elected
but failed to allege specifically an
attempt to vote for a federal officer,
was held insufficient. Blitz v. United
States, 153 U. S. 308 (1893) (even
though the indictment followed substantially the words of the statute) ;
United States v. Seaman, 23 Fed.
882 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1885). But
see In Re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 734
(1888).
In the instant case -the indictment
was sufficient since it charged that
qualified voters had been prevented
from casting ballots in a federal
election, but -the court held that
the supporting proof was inadequate.
Apparently the defense counsel offered to concede, in a written stipulation, that "at the election of 1932
there were candidates named for
the office of representative in
Congress . . . and for United States
-Senator" and the attorney for the
United States, relying on this concession as sufficient proof, did not
call upon his witnesses to testify
that they actually attempted to or
did vote for federal offices. It then
developed that th. so-called concession was "merely that voters had
the right to vote for federal offices,
not that they attempted to or did
vote for them." The court's reasoning appears technical since it
seems almost certain that the persons in question intended to vote
for federal as well as state officers.
This was a national election and the
intent to vote for national officers
,as alleged might well haye been
presumed. Nevertheless, the court
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decision is legally sound since an
intent to exercise a federal right is
an essential part of the government's case and should have been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In deciding the question of
whether the citizen was entitled to
get full value for his vote by receiving federal protection from
"ballot-stuffing," three United States
Supreme Court decisions are referred to by this court. United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476
(1916), does not seem to be in
point as is decided on the fact that
the alleged conspiracy -occurred during a party primary election to select
candidates and not during a congressionl election to select officers.
United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.
S. 220 (1917), is more difficult to
distinguish. The decision is based
on the fact that a conspiracy to
bribe voters, the crime chirged, was
"not clearly within §51, while bribery was specifically covered by a
section of the Act of 1820, previously repealed" hence it was concluded that the legislative intent was
to leave the punishment of bribery
committed during federal elections
to the several states. This same reasoning is applied, in the instant case,
to "ballot stuffing." However, it is
to be noticed that Mr. Justice McReynolds, who wrote the opinion in
the
Bathgate case specifically
stated that the citizen's "right to
vote" is shielded by §51. On this
point he cites United States v. Mosley, 238 U. S. 383 (1914), which
is the last of the three supreme
court cases referred to in the instant opinion.
In the Mosley case, supra, election
officers were held guilty under §51
for conspiring to omit certain precinct returns from their count. Mr.
Justice Holmes, who wrote the
opinion for the court, said: "We re-
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gardit as equally unquestionable that
the right to have one's vote counted
is as open to protection by Congress
as the right to put a ballot in a box."
Accord: Diulius v. United States,
79 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935) ;
Connelly v. United States 79 F. (2d)
373 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1935) (defendant was convicted for certifying only
forty-three votes for- democratic
candidates when eighty-one voters
testified they voted straight democratic tickets). It is submitted that
the Mosley decision definitely points
to a conclusion contrary to the one
reached in the instant case. Holmes
said the statute was violated if a
fraudulent reduction was made in
the total number of votes cast, while
this court now says that the statute
is not violated if a fraudulent addition is made. The court attempts
to distinguish the Mosley case by
saying that "subtracting votes from
the final tally actually deprives individuals of votes honestly cast."
But these individuals seem to be
just as effectively deprived of their
vote if sufficient "stuffed ballots" are
counted to cancel their legal votes.
A furthen distinction is apparently
attempted by referring to the one
right as a "definite personal one, capable of enforcement by a court" and
to the other as. a "political, non-judiciable one common to all that the
public shall be protected against
harmful acts." Is this any more than
a juggling of words in which a decision is made rather than a reason
given? In fact, do not both rights
involve a political relationship which
is protected by a statute making it
criminal to conspire to prevent a
citizen from casting his legal weight
upon the electoral scales?
The validity of the distinction
between addition and subtraction of
votes is questionable in view of the
fact that in 1933 the present court,
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the same judges sitting, in United
States v. Pleva, 66 F. (2d) 529 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1933), convicted election
officers of a crime under §51, where
the evidence showed that these officers in reading off the eighty-nine
totals from the voting machine failed
to read off a single one correctly.
The totals for eighteen democratic
candidates were all raised those for
sixteen republican candidates were
raised, and for two decreased; and
the vote cast for every other candidate was decreased. This court there
made no distinction between adding
and subtracting votes from the totals. Instead it expressly approved
the Mosley case, -supra, and carefully distinguished United States v.
Gradwell, supra, and United States
v. Bathgate, supra.
There is no doubt that there was
here a flagrant interference with
the right of citizens to get full
value for their votes. The decision
seems regretably technical. There
is no need to stress the danger
which hovers over the ballot-box,
particularly in large metropolitan
centers. This danger to the most
vital element of representative government has been met by the state
courts with such scant success that
the failure of the federal courts to
carry their share of the burden by
protecting federal elections will be
doubly unfortunate.
Editorials,
Chicago Daily News, October 1, 1935,
p. 18; October 1, 1935, p. 12; October 21, 1935, p. 8; October 24,
1935, p. 18 ("Voters are losing faith
in the ballot. That is one of the
greatest dangers now threatening
Democracy . . ." On the whole
problem of state administration of
elections, see HARRIS, ELEcrIoN
ADMINISTRATION
IN THE UNITED
STATES, Brookings Institution for

Government Research, No. 27, especially pp. 103, 114, 236, 328, 358,

and 359. This is particularly true
in view of the fact that a policy of
liberal construction, made so easy
by Mr. Justice Holmes' decision in
United States v. Mosley, would
quickly put the fear of the federal
courts upon the ballot-box gangster.
CHARLES BARNES.

LARCENY

FROM

REPAIRMAN

BY

OWNER-PoszssoRY LIEN AS SUBJECT OF LARcENY.-[Minnesota] Defendant was convicted of larceny in
the second degree for the felonious
taking of her own fur coat from a
furrier with wl-em she had left the
coat for repairs at the agreed price
of $50. The defendant, at her own
request, was given the coat for the
purpose of trying it on. Having obtained possession, she refused to return the garment and concealed it.
The jury believed that the taking
was deliberate and felonious. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, the conviction was
affirmed. Held: the felonious taking of a fur coat by its owner from
the possession of a furrier who has
according to statufe a lien thereon
for the price of the repairs is larceny. MINN. STAT. (Mason 1927)
§§8507, 8508, 10372. State v.
Cohen, 263 N. W. 922 (Minm. 1935).
'In order to understand the effect
of this decision, it is necessary to
consider what kind of ownership
in property may be the subject matter of larceny. Larceny at common
law is a felony, and is defined as
the felonious taking and carrying
away of the personal goods of another, Miller, CRIMINAL LAW (1934)
p. 340. That ownership must be
in someone other than the thief, has
always been a fundamental prerequisite. Benton v. State, 21 Tex.
App. 554, 2 S. W. 885-(1886); Love
v. State, 78 Ga. 66, 3 S. E. 893
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- I

(1886) (larceny by vendor of the
property; the contract of sale must
be complete); State v. Williamson,
118 Mo. 146, 23 S. W. 1054 (1893)
(larceny by assignor; assignment
must be valid). Furthermore, it has
even been held that the person from
whom the property was taken must
have ownership as well as possession. State v. James 133 Mo. App.
300, 113 S. W. 232 (1908). An authoritative exception to this general
ownership requirement may be
found in the leading case of Henry
v. State 110 Ga. 750, 36 S. E. 55
(1899) which, expresses the wellsettled rule that property in the
hands of a bailee may be the subject of larceny by its general owner
where it is taken with intent to
charge the bailee with its value.
Property upon which a repairman
has a lien for services has also been
held a fitting subject for larceny by
its general owner when removed
clandestinely -from the possession
of the repairman, People v. Long, 50
Mich. 249, 15 N. W. 105 (1882).
From a general inspection of the
cases, it would seem that the rule
making a chattel the proper subject
of larceny by its general owner from
a rebairman, or bailee, has been
evolved in those cases where the
lien was created by services of actual value. State v. Hubbard, 126
Kan. 129, 266 Pac. 939 (1928);
Tuinuty v. Parker, 100 Ill. App.
382 (1902); annotation 58 A. L. R.
330.
Jn the light of the above survey
of the ownership requirement in larceny, it would seem that the Minnesota Supreme Court has stretched
the subject matter of larceny to include a very extreme situation. In
the instant case, there was neither
intent to charge the furrier with the
value of the coat, nor was there
a clandestine taking. Furthermore,

the court denied admission of expert
testimony on the part of the defendant to show that the furrier's
services were of no value and that
therefore, no lien or special ownership was created in the furrier. It
would seem that the court might find
some support in the old case of
State v. Samuel Stephens, 32 Tex.
156 (1869). There the defendant
had left a watch for repairs. After
the job was done, the defandant
feloniously took the watch without
the knowledge of the watchmaker,
and without paying for the work.
The Texas court said, "The repairs
imply value. Repairs are alleged.
No value of repairs need be alleged.
. . . It is but a question of fact to
be proved on trial that the repairs
were made, in order to show that the
bailee had an interest in the thing
fraudulently taken." Yet it might
be pointed out that at least inferentially, the court meant that the defendant had the power of overthrowing the implication of value
and showing that the bailee had no
interest in the thing fraudulently taken. In view of the fact that value
and ownership have always been
considered necessary prerequisites in
determining whether a particular
chattel is a proper subject for larceny, it seems rather harsh to convict a woman of larceny of her own
coat from a furrier regardless of
whether the furrier has in fact
given some value for the interest
automatically created for him.
The result of the instant case is
to extend the borderline of larceny
into what ordinarily has been considered a field of civil law. It seems
that the prosecuting attorney's office
has been made a collection agency
for the unpaid accounts of business
men. The existence of a complete
civil remedy for the recovery of
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damages seems to make this undesirable.
SIDNEY M.

LIBIT.

SPEEDY TRIAL-RIGHT TO TRIAL
WITHIN FOUR MONTHS OF COMMITMENT.-[Illinois] Defendant was arrested on October 19, 1934, on a
charge of conspiracy. He voluntarily
accompanied the police officers to
Chicago where they wished to question him concerning his participation
in the beating of one Daiches. Until
the latter part of February, 1935,
defendant was continuously confined
in the Administration building in
Chicago. At that-time he was transferred to the county jail where he
remained until some time in June,
1935. No formal commitment was
ever issued. The conspiracy indictment was subsequently stricken. On
June 5th an indictment was returned charging defendant with assault with intent to kill. He was
found guilty and sentenced to the
penitentiary. On writ of error he
maintained that the court erred in
not granting his petition for discharge filed more than four months
following his arrest and confinement. The Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the conviction and ordered
defendant's discharge. Held: ILL.
STATE BAR STAT. (1935) c. 38, §771
provides that any prisoner committed for a criminal offense, and not
admitted to bail or tried within four
months of such commitment, shall
be set at liberty by the court unless
the delay be at his application. The
confinement was tantamount to commitment. Defendant was deprived
of his liberty and his right to a
speedy trial within the meaning of
the statute and was entitled to be
discharged. People v. Emblem, 199
N. E. 281 (Ill. 1935).
Governments which have deprived

937
their subjects of liberty arbitrarily
and without opportunity to be heard
are not unknown to history. See
"Lettres de cachet," 3 ENcyc. SOCIAL
ScIENCES (1931) p. 136. But such
practices are fundamentally opposed
to the spirit of Anglo-American law.
The right to a speedy trial was early
recognized at common law (See
State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 244, 98
Pac. 122, 126 (1908) for authorities
and discussion) and was assured by
statute in the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1680, 31 Car. II c. 2 (1680) (persons committed for felony or treason
to be tried or admitted to bail within specified time). 8 R. C. L. 70,
The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution gives the right
to a speedy trial in the federal
courts. Most state constitutions contain similar safeguards. E. g. ILL.
CONS?. (1870) Art. II sec. 9.
In some jurisdictions relief from
undue delay may be had by mandamus proceedings. Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 8th,
1925) ; Hicks v. Judge of Recorders
Court, 236 Mich. 689, 211 N. W. 35
(1926). In others habeas corpus is
available. Re Miller, 66 Colo. 261,
180 Pac. 749 (1919) ; State v. Dilts,
76 N. J. L. 410, 69 Atl. 255 (1908).
Contra: People ex rel. ,Freeman v.
Murphy, 212 Ili. 584, 72 N. E. 902
(1904). In many states, including
Illinois, where the defendant in a
criminal action has not been brought
to trial within the constitutional or
statutory period and a motion to the
trial court for discharge from the
indictment has been denied, the practice has been for him to take an
appeal or procure a writ of error
after having been tried and convicted. Von Feldstein v. State, 17
Ariz. 245, 150 Pac. 235 (1915);
Flagg v. State, 11 Ga. App. 37, 74
S. E. 562 (191"2); People ex rel.
Freeman v. Murphy, supra; State v.
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Lewis, 85 Kan. 586, 118 Pac. 59
(1911) ; State v. Keefe, supra. See
generally annotation (1929) 58 A.
L. R. 1510.
The right to speedy trial secured
by the Illinois Constitution and statute, supra, is absolute and not one to
be allowed at the discretion of the
trial court. People v. Heider, 225
Ill. 37, 80 N. E. 291 (1907) ; Newlin
v. People, 221 Ill. 66, 77, N. E. 529
(1906); People v. Jonas, 234 II1. 56,
84 N. E. 685 (1908); People v.
Szobar, 360 Ill. 233, 195 N. E. 648
(1935).
It should be noted, however, that under the express terms
of the statute the court may allow
a continuance for sixty days if satisfied that there is additional evidence
which the state can obtain within
that time and which* it has made
due exertion to obtain in the past.
Quinnt v. People, 220 Ill. 28, 27 N.
E. 101" (1906) (where. the court
granted a continuance under such
circumstances the right to discharge
under the statute was suspended).
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States, 201 Fed. 259 (C. C. A. 8th,
1912) (defendant acquiesced in postponement of trial) ; Hunter v. State,
30 P. (2d) 499, Ariz. (1934) (defendant asked for continuance) ; the
Illinois statute by its terms does not
run if defendant asked for a continuance.
Cf. People v. Jonas,
supra; Newlin v. People, supra
(fact that one or several judges of
superior court were sick is no excuse for delay); State v. Clark, 86
Ore. 464, 168 Pac. 944 (1917).
In the instant case the state's objection that the indictment under
which defendant actually went to
trial was issued shortly before the
trial could not prevail, for the
statute runs from the date of commitment not from the date of the
indictment or information. Gunthmann v. People, 203 Ill. 260, 67 N.
N. 821 (1903). To hold otherwise
would permit the prosecution to
avbid the discharge merely by dismissing the indictment on which the
four months had run and procuring
But to justify the continuance the a second under another section of
prosecutor must show that it is rea- the statutes. The state further sugsonably probable that such evidence gested that §771 could not run in this
will be forthcoming. Brooks v. Peo- case because there had been no forple, 88 Ill. 527 (1878).
If a dis- mal commitment by a court, but it
charge is granted the prisoner is was properly held that any imprisonrendered completely immune from ment of an accused is, broadly
further prosecution for the same of- speaking, a commitment and that the
fense. People v. Heider, supra.
statute ran from the date of deThe Illinois statute provides that fendant's
original
confinement.
if the defendant is admitted to bail Gunthmann v. People, supra.
the four months shall run only from
Many difficulties face a prosecutthe date on which a demand is made ing officer sincerely attempting to
for trial, People v. Fox, 269 Ill. 300, collect evidence against clever crimN. E. (1915), but where, as in the inals. There may be cases in which
instant case no bail was allowed, no the laws should be strained to give
demand is necessary and the statute him lee-way in temporarily detaincommences to run at commitment, ing notorious persons for questionPeople v. Grandstaff, 324 Ill. 70, 154 ing or pending further investigation,
N. E. 448 (1926). However, if de- but it is submitted that the instant
fendant himself is responsible for case is not one of them. It seems
the delay he will be held to have impossible to justify on any ground
waived the right. Phillips v. United this purely extra-legal detention of
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defendant for a period of over seven
months. The decision seems correct
in holding that both the letter and
the spirit of the statute and the
constitution were violated by this
unwarranted deprivation of a right
to a speedy trial.
CLARENCE LAMBESIS.

WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL IN CRIM-

INAL

CASE-COURT'S

CONSENT.-

[California] "The defendant in a
robbery prosecution waived jury trial
with the concurrence of the state's
attorney, under the California Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, which provides that "a trial by jury may be
waived in all criminal cases, by the
consent of both parties, expressed
in open court by the defendant and
his counsel."
Nevertheless, the
trial judge ordered a jury and defendant was convicted. On appeal,
affirmed. Held: The constitutional
provision for waiver of jury trial
does not take away from the trial
court the power to require the cause
to be tried by jury. People v. Eubanks, 46 P. (2d) 789 (Cal. App.
1935).
In the early days of the common
law criminal trials were by battle,
by compurgation or by jury at the
election of the accused. Trial by
jury, or by the country, as it was
called, was available only if the accused consented. 1 HOLDSWORTH,
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed.
1922) p. 823. This volitional element became purely theoretical,
however, for an unwilling defendant
was submitted to the rigors of peine
fort et dure until he gave his consent. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TRATISE ON EvDENCE (1896) p. 74 et
seq. Nevertheless, trial by jury came
to be looked upon as a great privilege and safe-guard against the inquisitorial methods of the Star
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Chamber and the king's agents. The
right to a jury trial is assured to all
citizens of the United States by the
federal and all state constitutions.
It has been held that these constitutional provisions establish the jury
as an essential part of the judicial
system and that a court has no jurisdiction to try a criminal case without a jury. See State v. Camby, 82
S. E. 715 (N. C. 1936). The better
rule, however, is that jury trial is
a privilege which the accused may
waive if he sees fit. Patton v. U.
S., 281 U. S. 276 (1930); People v.
Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722
(1930), Note (1931) 22 J. Crim. Law
113. In Maryland the practice of allowing the defendant in a criminal
trial to elect whether he will be tried
by the court or the jury dates back
to colonial days. Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal
Cases by Judges Alone, Without
Juries, (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 699.
The majority of states now allow
waiver of jury trial by statutory or
constitutional provision, and some by
judicial decision. The waiver may
be allowed in all criminal cases or in
misdemeanor cases only. See generally Oppenheim, Waiver of Jury
Trial in Criminal Cases (1927) 25
Mich. L. Rev.!695.
In Patton v. U. S., supra, the court
while holding that an accused could
waive a jury trial in a proper case
indicated that the right was not absolute. The court said, p. 312 "Not
only must the right of the accused
to trial by jury be jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the
jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and
has such a place in our traditions,
that, before any waiver can become
effective, the consent of government
counsel and the sanction of the court
must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the
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accused." This view that the jury
is an instrumentality of the court
which the judge may insist on to aid
him in a trial of the facts, in spite
of defendant's waiver, is the one
usually taken by the courts in absence of express statutory or constitutional provision. State v. Mead,
4 Blackf. 309 (Ind. 1837); Grand
Rapids v. Bateman, 93 Mich. 135, 53
N. W. 6 (1892) Ickes v. State, 63
Ohio St. 549, 59 N. E. 233 (1900).
In some states it is held that a
waiver by defendant shall be effective only if the state consents.
State v. Nash, 51 S. C. 319 (1897)
(statute); People v. Scornavache,
347 Ill. 403, 129 N. E. 909 (1931)
(judicial decision). See Morrison
v. State, 31 Okla. Crim. Rep. 11, 236
Pac. 901 (1925). See Hall, Has the
State a Right to Trial by Jury in
Criminal Cases? (1932) 18 A. B. A.
J. 226. Statutes in some states require that defendant's waiver be approved by the state and the court
both. Ind Ann.Stat. (Burns, 1933)
§9-1803; Wash. Camp. Stat. (Remington, 1932) §2144; N. J. Comp.
Stat. (1915) §1824.
But where a statutory or constitutional provision confers the privilege on the accused in absolute
terms, it has been held almost uniformly that the statute is mandatory and that the court has no discretion to deny the right if it is demanded. Boader v. State, 201 Ala.
76, 77 So. 370 (1917); State v.
Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878) ; Wadkins v. State, 127 Ga. 45, 56 S. E.
74 (1906); People v. Martin, 256
Mich. 33, 239 N. W. 341 (1931);
State v. Smith, 123 Ohio St. 237,
174 N. E. 758 (1931) ; Schulman I.
State, 76 Tex. Crim. Rep. 229, 173
S. W. 1195 (1915). But see Morrison v. State, supra. The theory
of these cases is that the statute
secures a personal privilege to the
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accused and that neither the state
nor the court have any such interest
as will permit of their interfering
with the right to waive. In State v.
Worden, supra, the court said, speaking of the Connecticut statute,
(p. 364) "The natural and obvious
meaning is to secure to suitors and
persons accused of crime, as individuals, the right and privilege of
having their causes heard and determined by a jury; and it is difficult
to see how the principles of liberty
and self-government or the interests
of the body politic, can in any way
be put in jeopardy by a waiver of
the aight." The instant case would
seem to be practically alone in allowving the court to override the defendant's waiver in the face of positive statutory authority.
The historical and theoretical aspects of jury trial are instructive in
respect to the judge's control over
the defendant's right to waive a
jury trial, but more important is a
consideration of the actual part
which a jury plays in the administration of criminal justice at the
present time. In the great majority
of cases the courts or legislatures
creating the right of waiver were
interested not in securing any new
privilege for the accused, but in cutting down the use of the jury, an
expensive, cumbersome and time
wasting institution.
Oppenheim,
supra p. 695, 6; GREN, JUDGE AND
JuRy (1930) c. 15. See State v.
Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 127 Atl. 916
(1925). The accused, however, often has a definite and legitimate interest in trial by the court rather
than by a jury. In cases involving
sexual offense, or situations which
have been publicized by the newspapers a jury is apt to be strongly
prejudiced. In the case of crimes
involving complicated and technical
fact situations like embezzlement or
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false pretenses the jury is often not Judge Maltbie, supra, does not feel
a competent body to pass on the that these objections are important.
facts. See Maltbie, Crininal Trials
The court in the instant case gave
lvithout q Jury in Connecticut no reasons for its holding. The
(1926) 17 J. Crim. L. 335; Bond, decision is against the overwhelmsupra. As a practical matter what ing weight of authority. It does
interest has the judge in retaining not seem sound when viewed from
a jury in a given case if the de- an historical point of view. If jury
fendant chooses to waive it? A trial is a privilege the defendant
trial by the court places an addi- should be able to waive it. From a
tional burden on the judge as a practical standpoint it is hard to see
trier of facts. It places additional what interest the judge or the comresponsibility on the court par- munity would have of sufficient imticularly where capital offenses portance to justify a denial of the
are concerned, since it forces the waiver. Finally, the result seems
single judge to pronounce the death undesirable since it retards the
penalty. If powerful political in- progress which is being made toward
terests were involved the court trial by the court in all criminal
might prefer to have the pronounce- cases.
ment of guilty made by a jury.
C. IvEs WALDO, JR.

